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Abstract

It is now practical to develop real-time software upon a
base of mostly commercial products. Using an
operating system, such as UNIX*, can provide a
standard execution environment that is compatible with
other commercial products. This will allow a reduction
in the cost of ground support and development
environment. The use of newer high order languages,
such as Ada, coupled with modem software engineering
practices, allows software developers to tackle and
control large software development efforts. Ada's high
level of abstraction and strong typing can make the
software program more understandable and prevent the
introduction of many errors.

The Space Station Freedom Data Management System
consists of state-of-the-art hardware and software
technology that exceeds the capabilities of earlier test
tools and methods used to verify and certify man-rated
space systems. New technologies and techniques are
being developed to meet these challenges.

Introduction
Hardware and software technologies have advanced to a
level that permits development of large and complex
systems, such as the Space Station Freedom, which have
a life of many years. The mission requirements over this
period as well as maintainability dictate system
architectures that are operationally flexible and
accommodate technology insertion. In addition to
crew/vehicle safety requirements for space systems,
these systems may have other requirements that could
not have been met cost effectively by older technologies.

These advancements in technology, however, have
outpaced our testing technology. Computer hardware
designs may preclude the use of processor control and
visibility tools used in previous manned space programs.
Software technologies, designed to exploit the increased
capabilities of hardware and to support software
engineering principles, may use methods including
dynamic memory allocations and optimization that can
add to verification difficulties. There are also features of
the Ada language that, if used improperly (but legally in
an Ada sense), may lead to software that is difficult to
lest or perhaps even untcstablc.

Hardware technology for space applications has evolved
to a level that allows reliable distributed processing over
high speed LANs using commercial standards. These
advancements provide much higher processing
bandwidth, virtual memory, greater control and
flexibility over the allocation and distribution of
processing functions, and a growth path consistent with
industrial directions.

This paper addresses these situations and presents
testing strategies that arc being validated for use on
space systems software.

*UNIX is a registered trademark of UNIX System Laboratories in the United States and other countries.
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Brief Overview of the
Space Station Data
Management System

architecture follows.

DMS Architecture
It was determined during the Phase B portion of the
Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP) that the
requirements of the DMS could be best satisfied by a
distributed architecture which implemented a number of
military and commercial standards in the data
processing field. Figure 1 shows the DMS architecture
chosen for the SSFP.

The Space Station Data Management System (DMS) is
comprised of both hardware and software elements that
provide all of the communication, object management,
system control, and user services to support the flight
application software that controls the operation of the
Space Station Freedom. A brief description of the

DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (DMS)

command and control functions required. The LANs arc
implemented using the MIL-STD-1553B linear bus
topology and communications protocol.

The DMS architecture consists of a core network and a
payload global network implemented using a dual ring
fiber optic topology that conforms to the Fiber
Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) standards. The
communications protocol that was chosen conforms to
ihe Open Systems Interconnect standards (ISO/OSI).
The core and payload networks arc physically and
functionally separated by a bridge. Local processing
environments, required by the Space Station process
control applications, arc provided by processing nodes
with Local Area Networks (LANs) for the dedicated

Figure 2 provides a functional depiction of the
architecture . It can be clearly seen that the DMS
provides three distinct data process domains as well as
the characteristics of each domain. Both the information
management and the process control domains consist of
processing elements that arc constructed from a standard
inventory of cards. Figure 3 presents a more detailed

4-2

view of the card types and iheir arrangement in the
processing elements. Of particular interest are the
Embedded Data Processors (EDPs) which are common
to all the elements. It is within the EDPs that the DMS
and applications software is executed.

OS/ARTE and modifications were made to the kernel to
support specific interfaces. Additionally, Ada was
specified by NASA as the programming language for
SSFP.

Man-Rated Software
Systems Testing

The EDPs are the space application equivalent of the
IBM PS/2 Model 80 personal computer. The processing
unit of the EDP is the Intel 386 processor. The Intel 386
was chosen because it is a commercial standard used
throughout industry; it provides a lasting technology
that has a growth path, and it provides the processing
flexibility required by the SSFP. The Intel 386SX
processor was chosen for the multiplexer/demultiplexer
(MDM) units.

Testing of man-rated software systems is extremely
critical because human lives are dependent on those
systems. Strict procedures must be implemented and
adhered to so that the system integrity will be
maintained.

Fault Avoidance/Fault
Tolerance

The software architecture employed in the SSFP is
presented in Figure 4. The architecture is implemented
through a set of common system service functions used
by all users and a set of applications software specific to
the process control function being performed. The
common system services provided by the DMS consist
of the following items:

Two basic strategies exist to develop software to deal
with faults for this environment. A fault is any failure in
the system that leads to an error in the way information is
processed. The first and most common strategy is fault
avoidance. Software developed for earlier NASA
spacecraft, such as the Space Shuttle, was developed
with this strategy. This approach places a significant
burden on software testing throughout the development
phase. Each software product, from the requirements
and design specification to the object code executing in
the actual flight hardware, must be rigorously verified.
This process can be expensive and can increase the
relative cost of software from about 20 percent to as
much as 40 percent.

1) Runtime Services
2) Global Communications Services
3) Local Bus I/O and Applications Communications
4) Human User Interface
5) File Services

The second strategy to handle faults is fault tolerance.
This approach requires that faults be detected and
recognized. The system must isolate the fault to prevent
its effects from propagating to other parts of the system.
The system must also provide some reconfiguration of
the system lo continue functioning until the fault can be
eliminated. Unlike fault avoidance, this approach places
a much greater burden on the design team to identify the
classes of faults and design software to handle the
detection, recognition, isolation, and reconfiguration
functions. The fault tolerant approach is not used in lieu
of fault avoidance, but in addition to it. While the fault
avoidance strategy seeks to produce "error free"
software, the fault tolerant strategy anticipates potential
system failures such as communication channel failures,
errors in man-machine interaction, and hardware
component failures. It introduces another level of test
concepts, policies, methods, and technology necessary
to deal with the added complexity of the system.

6) Hardware Management
7) Data Management
8) Operating System/Ada Runtime Environment
(OS/ARTE)
9) Network Operating System (NOS)
10) Standard Services (STSV)
11) User Support Environment (USE)
12) Data Storage and Retrieval (DSAR)
13) Systems Management (SM)
To minimize development costs and provide a system
consistent with future software technologies,
Commcrcial-Off-The-Shclf (COTS) software products
were chosen where feasible. As a result, a COTS UNIX
operating system was chosen as the kernel for the
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DMS Integration and Test
Methodology
The DMS integration and test methodology has evolved
from previous manned space flight programs including
Shuttle, Skylab, and Saturn/Apollo. The primary
experience gained through the Shuttle program has been
the major influence in the derivation of this
methodology. It provides valuable information on not
only the integration and lest phase but also an
organizational model to best ensure a complete and
adequate test program.
The primary objectives of the integration and test
methodology can be summarized in three key points.
1) Demonstrate that the DMS adheres to the letter of
the customer's requirements
2) Assure the DMS performs and supports the users in
accordance with the customer's operational
expectations
3) Provide software that is "error free*'
The first two objectives are quantifiable since they can
be explicitly tested. Specific test plans and scenarios
developed to cover all documented requirements can be
implemented and a one-to-one mapping of tests to
requirements can be established and maintained. The
third objective is more nebulous and, as experience has
shown, can only be approached asymptotically. How
rapidly and efficiently this goal is reached is dependent
on how effectively an organization is structured to
address the following areas:

The DMS organization has been developed from the
model provided by Shuttle. An organizational element
independent of software development, called
Integration, Test, and Verification (IT&V), has been
established to focus on the integration and test of DMS.
IT& V is cast in the role of the conscience of the project
and fosters a definite but healthy adversary relationship
between iisejf and the development organization.
The IT& V organization performs two major categories
of tests on the DMS. The first category is the detailed
requirements testing which covers each "shall" in the
requirements document. A requirements cross reference
matrix is developed and delivered to the customer which
maps the test cases to the requirements tested. The
second test category is system testing. System testing
includes testing the system in a realistic operational
environment, and subjecting it to nominal and
off-nominal stress conditions.
To accomplish both types of testing, the test tools and
lest environment must provide a number of basic
capabilities. To control the conditions of the testing and
establish the appropriate processing state, a capability
must be provided to set the initial state parameters of the
system. To acquire the proper data for evaluation of the
test results, visibility into the data locations within
memory must be provided. Additionally, knowledge of
the system state over time must be provided as a
potential triggering mechanism for setting the desired
processing conditions or acquiring the desired data.

3) Early definition and implementation of lest tools,
simulators, and other support software proven by a
thorough lest plan and maintained through
configuration control

The lest control, data visibility and access capabilities
must be provided in a manner that supports both
categories of testing being accomplished in a complete
system configuration and in an "unaltered 1 stale. An
unaltered state simply means the system under test must
beinihc configuration expected lo fly. Additionally, all
controls of the system under tesl required lo establish the
lest state, control the tcsi conditions, and extract the
required test data must not be detectable and must noi
affcci ihc flighi state. With these test constraint and
system element features, it is clear ihat there arc specific
challenges thai must be dealt with from a tesiing poini of
view.

4) Configuration control of the build and integration
of the evolving software system

System testing can be defined in terms of six different
levels. These levels arc described below.

5) Configuration control of ihe implementation and
retest of the software changes resulting from
requirements upgrades and discrepancy corrections

Level 1 Testing (Unit)

1) Early definition and application of programming
standards and techniques
2) Establishment of tests, audits, and code inspections

6) Step-wise integration and testing of the system
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During development, specific testing is done to ensure
thai mathematical equations and logic paths provide the
results cxpcclcd.

Level 2 Testing (Functional)

special test equipment The advantage of this testing
method is that more visibility of the software is allowed;
however, completely nonintrusive test devices are
usually costly and do not always solve all of the testing
dilemmas.

This development test activity is similar to Level 1 but
expanded to include all interfacing modules required to
satisfy a specific user input command.
Level 3 Testing (Subsystem)

Space Shuttle Program

Level 3 Testing demonstrates the ability of a particular
subsystem to execute all of its nominal functions.
Multiple functions are tested as well as timing.

Both the hardware and software technology used on the
Space Shuttle Program were unlike that of today's Space
Station systems. The primary onboard Shuttle computer
system is centered around IBM AP-101 General
Purpose Computers (GPCs). Testing of the Space
Shuttle flight software typically involved simulators
communicating with the GPCs to drive external
interfaces. The execution of software on the GPCs was
monitored and tested primarily by stopping the GPC
during an execution run and dumping data out of the
machine to be analyzed later.

Level 4 Testing (System)

Level 4 Testing exercises enure systems to test
operational sequences and monitor system performance.
Level 5 Testing (Release Validation)

This activity involves repeating all of the Level 4 tests in
the actual flight hardware environment.
Level 6 Testing (Design Validation)

Because the GPC contained a single processor, all
software execution could be frozen during a simulation.
Once the appropriate data was collected, the GPC was
"started" again. Because of the controls allowed in the
interface test equipment that stopped the GPC processor,
software execution on the GPC was not affected. In
short, the software never "knew" that it had been
stopped.

Level 6 Testing (usually performed independantly of
prior levels) involves testing the system to design
requirements including timing and performance
requirements.

Space Station Testing
Objectives

Some flight software modifications were made to
accomodate the test environment. To accomplish a GPC
stop during certain execution states of the processor,
elements of the flight software were instrumented to
support the test environment. NASA fell that this "test
scar" was acceptable because of the test capabilities
provided.

Figures 5 through 8 depict the testing objectives at each
level for the DMS.

Typical Testing
Methodologies Used
Black Box

The Space Shuttle software testing methodology is a
good example of pure "white box" testing at all lest
levels.

Black Box testing implies the testing of software simply
by exercising all external interfaces to the Box upon
which the software is executing. The advantages of this
testing method are that usually fewer, less complex test
devices arc needed and no instrumentation of the
software under test is required. The disadvantages arc
limited visibility into the software execution and the
extent of the lest suite required to test the potential
ranges of all interfaces.

Challenges to Test Space
Station Software

The Space Station Freedom Program, as described
previously, employs a distribulcd architecture for DMS
services and application software. The software used to
implement this system will be written in Ada and will
execute in a Unix environment. The challenges of
testing such a system are described below.

White Box
White Box testing implies the testing of software by
monitoring and controlling its execution on the Box with
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Language
In previous languages used on man-rated programs,
limitations on program behavior ruled out many
potential faults, since the language could not express
certain types of processing.. With Ada, many of these
built-ifi restrictions fiave been eliminated. Thft Ad^
language has its own restrictions, recognizes certain
abstractions explicitly, and provides a framework for
dealing with them.

Ada Risk Areas
Ada's high level of abstraction, dynamic allocation, and
optimization makes low level testing (i.e. use of compile
time absolute addresses, memory dumps, and assembly
debugging) impractical except for subprograms. Also,
100 percent deterministic paths may not be guaranteed
in an asynchronous, multitasking program.
The Ada language provides the opportunity to improve
program quality if it is properly used. Its features allow
software engineers to develop programs that are more
understandable, reliable, and maintainable. However,
there are features that, if used indiscriminately in real
time systems, can lead to software programs that are
difficult to test. These are listed below.
1) Strong typing and subtype mechanisms may create
inefficient execution making it more difficult to
validate performance requirements
2) Subprograms formed by composite functions can
lead to unpredictable storage use

10) Dynamic allocation of memory makes it more
difficult to predict whether a program will meet its
storage constraints

Software Technology
The UNIX Operating System (OS) and its associated
Ada Run Time Environment (ARTE) provide a highly
flexible, real-lime platform upon which the DMS
services and user applications can execute. However,
the unpredictability of the way in which the OS/ARTE
schedules and manages the various software tasks
executing in this environment produces many
difficulties in testing these software elements.

UNIX Risks
The UNIX environment allows for run-time
^configurability and shuffling of OS resources by
employing the concept of Virtual Memory. A few of the
features of UNIX and its use of Virtual Memory that
produce testing difficulties are listed below.
1) . Lack of visibility into functions and operations
being performed by the operating system
2) Inability to synchronize or stop all hardware
elements and OS processes
3) Lack of determinism in task scheduling
4) Dynamic memory allocation

Hardware Technology

5) Use of generics may be inefficient or make it
difficult to analyze time and space use

The distributed processing capabilities of the DMS are
required to support the flexibility of multiple flight
software applications and the various resources that
they must access. Also, within each SDP, multiple
processors arc required to meet the throughput and
processing requirements of these applications. The
complexity of such a system only increases the difficulty
in testing software that executes in that environment.
The major hardware architecture features of the DMS
that induce risks in testing arc:

6) Exceptions may lead to inefficient execution

1) Distributed Processors

3)

Subprograms with global variables or side effects
result in interfaces that are difficult to test

4) Use of generics may not be consistent with design
intent

The major issues with testing software executing on
a distributed processing system appear at the upper
levels (4 - 6) of the test process.

7) Exceptions may lead to more complex interfaces
making them more difficult to test
8) Behavior of predefined exceptions can sometimes
be unpredictable

2) Multiple Processors within an SDP
The major issues of testing software that executes
on multiple processors within a single SDP affect
testing at all levels.

9) Tasking may lead to nondcicrministic behavior in
time and space

4-6

3) Pipelined Processors

hierarchy of verification methods and maintaining
consistency between the development and execution
environments. While verification al (he software unit
level will rely on traditional and proven methods, higher
levels of system testing will rely on trusted interfaces
within applications, runtime, pre-runtime, and
hardware systems. These interfaces specify the
functional characteristics of the system. Once these
interfaces are defined, verified, and basclined, they
provide the coniexi for higher levels of program
execution. The features of the health monitoring
software can provide access to system data to support
nonintrusive verification.

The SDP primary processor is a pipelined
processor. In simple terms, this means thai it will
"feich" instructions from memory prior to their
actual execution. This feature is necessary to
achieve the processing power required of the SDP.
Testing at all levels is affected due to the inability to
control test operation based on actual instruction
execution.

DMS Integration and
Verification Methodology
The strategy for verifying the DMS requires a change in
the verification paradigm. The old paradigm being that
for the- integration and lest of Space ShutUe flight
software. A discussion of the differences between the
paradigms and recommended options for a modified
verification methodology for Space Station DMS
follows.

The levels and techniques of verification planned for ihe
DMS are described below. While the reliability of some
of these has been proven on prior space systems, other
techniques are being developed and validated.

Approaches to Solving Test
Challenges

The Paradigm Shift

The challenges posed above are very new to the lest
requirements of man-rated software based programs.
Some would consider this task to be much more
challenging than that of the implementation of the
system itself. Although these issues are still being
addressed, a solid test approach is being implemented to
effectively solve the issues with the lowest cost to the
Space Station Program.

The former paradigm assumed a centralized processor,
static allocation of memory, and a cyclic executive with
high frequency control loops. All software was
designed and tested for fault avoidance, and any flight
software that only supported testing was minimized.
Error free confidence in ihe software was principally
achieved by demonstrating determinism by having
system level visibility to all data.
This was
accomplished with various visibility tools through six
levels of testing ranging from unit to system level. This
was practical for the amount of flight software (less than
100,000 lines of code) on the Shutilc. While hardware
and software technology used in ihe DMS may prevent
the use of older verification techniques at the system
level, even if it were technically feasible, ihe amounl of
flight software (approximately 900,000 lines of code of
DMS software plus several hundred thousand lines of
application software) and its distributed nature makes it
cost prohibitive to use these techniques.

Test Philosophies
The general approach for testing Space Station software
involves a combination of a black box and a while box
mcihodology providing an extremely flexible
environment that can be used to support each icsi level.
Different elements of this environment are used to
"certify" the system before stepping to the next level.
Also, certain software implementation standards are
being proposed thai would force the software lo be more
"testable". A description of these tools and standards
follows.

Test Tools

The current paradigm assumes a distributed processing
system, dynamic allocation of memory, and an
asynchronous executive with low frequency control
loops. Besides application flight software, other
mission software will be used to monitor and report the
health and status of the system and to provide
reconfiguration if a system fault occurs. Confidence in
the software will be achieved by building upon a

The basic environment for all levels of test is centered
around a simulation host thai will provide ihe necessary
processing power to simulate the required interfaces at
each lesl level. The simulation host is attached to the
DMS elements via interface hardware thai is of a similar
archiiccturc base as ihe DMS itself. Nol only docs ihis
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Bus Monitors/Simulators

reduce cost by utilizing reusable software in the
interface equipment, but it provides for the capability to
move functionality of the simulations down into the
interface hardware to support throughput and processing
requirements. Figure 9 depicts the test environment for
Space Station software.

Bus monitors and simulators are provided for both the
FDDI (global) and the 1553 (local) buses. These
elements provide the "black box" test capabilities.

FDDI Network Monitor

Simulation Host

This unit provides the capability to monitor traffic on the
FDDI network based on triggers and filters specified by
the simulation host

The simulation host executes various models that are
required to supply the missing elements in each test
level. For example, at the lower test levels, more
interface simulations and processing is required of the
simulation host because only one SDP is used. At the
highest test levels, the complete system is used in a fully
integrated manner, therefore, minimal simulation
equipment is needed.

FDDI Network Simulator
This unit can simulate multiple or single nodes on the
FDDI network. The higher levels of the network
communication protocols are tested in this unit as well.

Local Bus Subunit

The simulation host provides post-processing tools for
analysis and correlation of simulated and real data.
The simulation host also provides the necessary tools to
support the software symbolic referencing and cross
debugging requirements.

This unit can respond to requests for data over the 1553
bus from an SDP as if a real MDM were connected. It
can also simultaneously simulate a bus controller
requesting data and a bus monitor recording traffic.

Software Execution
Monitoring/Breakpoint and
Event Trapping

The current proposed test approaches to meet each of the
challenges described above utilizing these test tools are:

Test Approaches
Ada

Software monitoring tools are provided for both the SDP
and MDM elements of the DMS by the SDDU and
MDM I/F subunits respectively. These elements
provide the "white box" test capabilities.

Some of the challenges of testing Ada could be solved
through the selection of a high-quality optimizing
compiler to eliminate unnecessary run-time type
checking and to implement subprogram calls with
minimal overhead.

System Development and Diagnostic
Unit (SDDU)
The SDDU provides a passive monitoring capability of
software executing in an SDP by "listening'* to fetches
that occur between the processor and memory. It can
also be used to snap data directly from memory or patch
over locations of memory. An "on-lhc-fly" capability is
provided that allows data to be snapped or patched
instantaneously based on a predefined event.

MDM Interface Unit
The MDM Interface Unit provides an internal debug
interface to the MDM processor. It allows similar
capabilities as the SDDU. The MDM Interface Unit also
supports simulated sensor/effector I/O for up to five
MDMs driven by host simulations.

48

Most of the challenges of testing Ada impact the lower
test levels and could be met through the use of a resident
Ada debugger. Specifically, non-performance related
requirements place on lower elements within software
functionality could be verified for proper code path
execution and expected results. Also, detailed equations
within applications could be verified for accuracy given
all ranges of possible inputs. The system level or
performance related requirements would be verified
with the existing non-intrusive tools described earlier.
Although there is some risk with this method in that the
debugger could actually impact the test environment, the
visibility provided by a debugger far outweighs these
risks.
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choose an implementation strategy for generics by
means of a pragma.
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Multiple approaches are being taken to address UNIX
issues.
1) Again, a resident debugger is recommended for the
lower test levels in areas that involve the Ada to
UNIX interaction
2) Deterministic path labels are recommended for
performance measurements and OS monitoring
3) Address resolution tools are being developed that
allow the user to monitor software based on
symbols. The virtual to physical addresses are
resolved after the software is loaded

4) Exceptions are pan of a module's interface and
should be well documented. Exception handling
and propagation should be planned as an overall
strategy for maintaining system integrity.
Exceptions should not be used for determining
conditional processing in the normal execution of
an algorithm.
5) Nondeterminism is inherent in any system with
asynchronous events. The following guidelines are
recommended for Ada tasks.
-

Tasks should not depend on other tasks except
at synchronization points.

Multiple Processors

-

The approaches to address testing of software in a
multiprocessor environment are:

Task logic should not depend on the choice in a
selective wait.

-

Tasks should employ deadlock detection
schemes.

1) The SDDU read and write "on-the-fly" capability
is being recommended to capture data in real lime
without having to stop software execution.

Use monitor tasks to provide access to shared
data to avoid race conditions.
Packages containing hidden variables should
only be used by one task to avoid race
conditions, otherwise use a monitor task within
the package.

2) Applications are required to be self-starting and
self re-starting.
3) The simulation host will support a "checkpoint" of
journal data so that even with distributed
processing, the system state can be recreated for
problem resolution.

Software Implementation
Standards
Ada
The majority of the risks of testing Ada could be
minimized through the use of proper education and
programming guidelines. A few of the recommended
guidelines are included below.
1) Reduce the use of global variables. All data should
be passed to a package through parameters.
2) Document all expected use of storage.
3) Develop generic packages, rather than a generic
subprogram, and document all assumptions made
about the properties of the generic parameters.
Select a compiler that allows the programmer to

6) Use representation clauses to limit run time
allocation of storage and use an exception handler
to initiate recovery upon pre-defincd storage error
exceptions.

Summary
The software testing objectives for the Space Station
Freedom Program have initially been met by applying a
philosophy of testing very similar to that of the Space
Shuttle Program and through the use of a complex set of
flexible tools and implementation standards.
The task of integrating and testing flight software for the
SSFP is still in its early stages. Although many tools and
capabilities exist or arc planned, the difficulties
encountered during these early stages will most likely
dictate the need lor additional support tools. In cases
where tools arc unavailable or arc not cost effective, a
change in the methodology of software testing and
verification that deviates from the Space Shuttle
metluxlology may be rcquirccd.
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